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I.   INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, the citizens of this country express concern regard-
ing the need for additional protection under the right of privacy, also
known as the “right to be let alone.” Recent polls reflect that eighty
percent of Americans believe they have lost control over their per-
sonal information1 and that ninety percent favor legislation to pro-
vide additional privacy protections.2 These elevated rates of citizen
concern are the direct result of recent sophisticated technological ad-
vances, advances which make it both cheap and easy to categorize
and to track what was once thought to be private information.3 To
properly examine how to best address these concerns, it is important
to understand that Florida is one of the few states in this country to
have an express right of privacy in its constitution to protect against
government intrusion. Florida’s provision provides:
ARTICLE I, SECTION 23. Right of privacy.—Every natural person
has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion
into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This sec-
tion shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to
public records and meetings as provided by law.4
Since the provision’s adoption in 1980, it has become a significant
part of Florida’s jurisprudence.
The provision impacts the rights of free press, free speech, and
the Florida constitutional and statutory provisions regarding public
records and public meetings.5 It has been used to limit governmental
intrusion into both the areas of personal decision-making and the
disclosure of private information.6 All of these interlocking rights
and applications have made the right of privacy a true legal chame-
leon. In the new “age of technology” or “information age” in which we
now live, protecting privacy will undoubtedly become even more im-
portant to the citizens of this state.
However, it is critical to recognize that this provision protects
only against intrusions by the government.7 It does nothing to pro-
tect citizens from intrusions by private or commercial entities. With-
out question, it is this latter intrusion that will present the greatest
privacy challenge in the coming decade and the twenty-first century.
                                                                                                                   
1. See ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCOTT, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR
PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 89 (1997) (listing results of a 1995 Equifax-Harris Mid-
Decade Consumer Privacy Survey).
2. See id. (listing results of a 1995 privacy survey by Yankelovich Partners).
3. See Doug Stanley, Big Brother Attitude Thrives in Workplace, TAMPA TRIB., Jan.
1, 1997, at 6.
4. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
5. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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As technology develops, more and more methods for assimilating and
distributing information will likely become available.8 As the United
States Supreme Court has recognized, an individual’s interest in
controlling the dissemination of personal information should “not
dissolve simply because that information may be available to the
public in some form.”9 Given the current state of technology, as well
as the potential for more sophisticated advancements, the time is
ripe to consider taking steps that may ensure protection of our pri-
vacy into the future. Otherwise, “[p]rivacy as we know it may not
exist in the next decade.”10
To that end, Part II of this Article addresses the concerns and
challenges presented to personal privacy in the information age. Part
III analyzes the development of federal and Florida constitutional
privacy rights as well as civil common law actions for invasion of
privacy and statutory protections. Part IV suggests solutions, includ-
ing a textual addition to Florida’s constitutional privacy provision to
secure protection from intrusion into private spheres by non-
governmental entities.
II.   THE CHALLENGE: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON OUR PRIVACY
Who knows about you? What is it that they know? How many
“cookies” have you given away today? Technology has made it possi-
ble to pry into almost every area of our lives. In his book, 1984, we
were warned by George Orwell to watch out for “Big Brother.” Today,
we are cautioned to look out for “little brother”11 and “little sister.”12
It is no longer simply intrusion by the government of which we
should be wary; it is intrusion by various commercial entities looking
to profit from the use of private information as well.
On an almost daily basis, we are confronted with invasions of pri-
vacy of which we may be totally unaware. Whenever you use an
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) card, purchase something from a
store, purchase an airline ticket, rent a movie or hotel room, “surf”
the Internet, or simply use a telephone, an electronic record of your
activity is generated.13 All of these activities can be traced and re-
corded in various databases acting as storage banks of personal in-
formation.
                                                                                                                   
8. See infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.
9. United States Dep’t of Def. v. Federal Lab. Rel. Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994)
(interpreting the Freedom of Information Act).
10. CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 80.
11. Id. at 51-52.
12. JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE 22 (1992).
13. See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 53.
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For instance, Internet services can now track the “clickstream” of
traffic to monitor pages accessed on the Internet.14 “Cookies” and
“mouse droppings” are two methods by which users of the Internet
can be traced. Cookies allow an Internet site to store information to a
visitor’s hard drive so that when the user returns to that site, the
site reads the cookie from the hard drive to learn whether the user
has previously visited the site.15 Mouse droppings allow an Internet
site to identify who is visiting that site.16
Further, through a process called data matching, a compilation of
your purchases and activities can be sorted and matched to form a
profile on you, listing your personal tastes, buying patterns, and life-
styles.17 In effect, the information is “digitized, linked, packaged,
sold, and re-sold.”18 You can then be targeted by various commercial
entities for marketing purposes. As one author has stated, “[y]our
name is wanted for databases from the moment you are born: birth
is the time to sell to your parents; death is the time to sell to your
survivors. The time between the two is the time to sell to you.”19
Technology has made access to other personal information readily
accessible as well. Credit files, driving records,20 health records, em-
ployment files, vehicle registrations,21 social security information,22
car rentals, warranty registrations, music club purchases, charitable
donations, magazine subscriptions, mail-order catalog purchases,
frequent flyer records, detailed financial records, and family struc-
tures are also now available.23 While limited restrictions are placed
on the access to some of this information, the information may be ob-
tained with little effort.24 In his book, Privacy for Sale, Jeffrey Roth-
feder outlines in detail just how easy it is to access much of this in-
formation.25 As he explains, for a fee, one can obtain bank records,
                                                                                                                   
14. See id. at 102.
15. See BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 7 (1997).
16. See Trudie Bushey, FTC & Internet Privacy, CREDIT WORLD, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at
7.
17. See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 56-58; ROTHFEDER, supra note 12,
at 15.
18. Chris O’Malley, Welcome to a Small Town Called the Internet, POPULAR SCIENCE,
Jan. 1997, at 56, 57.
19. David McKendry, Peep Show, CA MAG., Sept. 1996, at 16.
20. See Internet Department of Motor Vehicles (visited July 13, 1997)
<http://www.ameri.com/dmv/dmv.htm> (containing driver’s license information and his-
tory for all fifty states for a fee).
21. See id. Motor vehicle information for all fifty states is also available.
22. For a fee, one service will provide an abundance of information regarding social
security numbers. See The Stalker’s Home Page (visited July 13, 1997)
<http://www.glr.com/stalk.html>. This site also includes a number of other items regard-
ing privacy.
23. See ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 15; McKendry, supra note 19, at 16.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See ROTHFEDER, supra note 12.
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credit charges, nonpublished numbers, post office boxes, social secu-
rity earnings, safe deposit boxes, Internal Revenue Service records,
and much, much more.26
As some in the legal field already know, services such as Westlaw
Publishing Group, Inc., will provide access to a seemingly unending
amount of personal information. This includes bankruptcy records,
lawsuit records, property assessors’ records, asset locators, and peo-
ple finders.27 In testing this fairly basic database, the following in-
formation was obtained on author Justice Overton in less than ten
minutes: his full name; the address of his Tallahassee residence; his
telephone number; date of birth; and social security number; the
same information for his wife; the median income of his neighbor-
hood; the median value of the homes in his neighborhood; the names
of ten of his closest neighbors (including their addresses and tele-
phone numbers); and similar information on his condominium in an-
other city. All of the information obtained was correct.
Furthermore, just by surfing the Internet, the authors were able
to obtain information from county property appraiser reports detail-
ing property values, square footages, and mortgage values;28 access
credit reports for a fee;29 obtain telephone numbers and maps of resi-
dences for anyone in the country with a published telephone num-
ber;30 and examine, by zip code, who has contributed to federal cam-
paigns.31
The possibilities for compiling information are endless. “Smart
cards” are being proposed that would contain computer chips with
one’s health history and other data to assist in emergencies.32 Micro-
chips containing information identifying pet owners have been
placed in household pets.33 Chips containing health history have, in
a few instances, been placed in humans experimentally.34 “Smart
                                                                                                                   
26. See id. at 78; ALFRED GLOSSBRENNER & JOHN ROSENBERG, ONLINE RESOURCES
FOR BUSINESS 30, 126 (1995).
27. See WESTLAW PUBLISHING CORP., WESTLAW DATABASE DIRECTORY 141-44 (1997).
28. See, e.g., Leon County Property Appraiser’s Office (visited July 13, 1997)
<http://www.co.leon.fl.us/propappr/prop.htm>.
29. See e.g. Experianexpo (formerly known as TRW) (visited July 13, 1997)
<http://www.experian.com/>.
30. A vast number of international and national telephone on-line directories are
available. See e.g., Switchboard (visited July 13, 1997) <http://www.switchboard.com/>
(includes maps to place of number); Infospace Directory (visited July 13, 1997)
<http://www. infospaceinc.com/> (includes door-to-door instructions to addresses); Yahoo
Phone Directory (visited July 13, 1997)
<http://www.yahoo.com/search/people/phone.html>; Database America (visted July 13,
1997) <http://www.databaseamerica.com/>; Four 11 (visited July 13, 1997)
<http://www.four11.com/>.
31. See FECInfo (visited July 13, 1997) <http://www.tray.com/fecinfo/>.
32. See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 77-78.
33. See id. at 83.
34. See id.
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meters” can actually track the type of appliances you use and how of-
ten you use them.35 The continued spread of “automated surveillance
systems” will soon mean that every movement on foot and by car
may be tracked, day or night.36 Furthermore, the vast array of elec-
tronic communication gadgets with which we outfit ourselves, such
as cell phones, portable phones, baby monitors, pagers, personal
digital assistants, interactive cable systems, and laptop computers,
create other avenues for invasion of our privacy.37
Obviously, the age of technology has made our lives easier in
many respects. It provides us with useful information at the touch of
a button and, for the most part, serves socially useful ends. For ex-
ample, datamatching can be used to match items such as income tax
refund recipients against the names of delinquent borrowers from
the student loan programs.38 It can also provide information regard-
ing the whereabouts of known sexual predators.39
However, at some point, the collection of data can become so in-
trusive that it constitutes what has become known as “data rape.”40
What is to prohibit providing information regarding your personal
activities to direct marketers, insurance companies, employers, or
credit bureaus? If you rent an erotic “pay-per-view” movie from your
satellite dish or cable company, should your employer have access to
that information? How much privacy should you expect when you
send electronic mail (e-mail) on your employer’s computer? Do you
have the ability to limit the sale of your personal information by one
company to another? Should you have knowledge of the sale so that
you can correct erroneous information? How confidential is your
medical history and who should have access to that information? As
genetic information about individuals becomes identifiable, should
that information be available to insurance companies, employers, or
even the government?
In essence, it is protection from the secondary use of personal in-
formation that poses one of the most difficult challenges. How do we
protect against abuse or misuse of personal information collected by
an entity for one purpose when that entity sells the information to
another entity for one or more unrelated purposes without the con-
sent of the individual about whom that information pertains?
Moreover, it is not just commercial entities that are profiting from
                                                                                                                   
35. See id. at 82.
36. See Big Brother: The All-Seeing Eye, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 1997, at 52.
37. See John Markoff, Technologies Battle at New Frontier of Eavesdropping, TALL.
DEM., Jan. 19, 1997, at 6A.
38. See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 56-57.
39. See Abner K. Mikva, The Mixed Blessing of Public Disclosure, MIAMI DAILY BUS.
REV., Jan. 7, 1997, at A2.
40. CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 66.
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the sale and exchange of this type of information. During the 1997
legislative session the Legislature contemplated the sale of data-
bases containing public record information for secondary private
use.41 The bill, however, failed to pass the Committee on Governmen-
tal Reform & Oversight.
The secondary use of personal information poses many problems
for the individual who is the subject of that information. For exam-
ple, personal information may be incorrect. It is estimated that the
level of error in large information databases is between twenty to
thirty percent.42 This is problematic when one considers that this in-
formation is considered by employers, businesses, and insurance
companies when making employment, credit, and insurance-related
decisions. Additionally, inequities may occur when personal infor-
mation is available for personal use by some but not by others. For
instance, in Florida, a state employee’s personnel records are public
information. The availability of such records can pose a serious
problem when, during a divorce, one spouse is employed by the state
and the other by a private employer. The privately employed spouse
will have ready access to significant personal information that the
publicly employed spouse may not.
In the following section, the protection of privacy rights and the
law is examined. As discussed below, the concept of privacy protec-
tion is a relatively new legal doctrine and currently existing law
provides very limited protection in many areas.
III.   THE LAW
One of the first references to a right of privacy appeared just a
little more than one hundred years ago in Thomas M. Cooley’s trea-
tise on the law of torts, wherein Cooley coined the phrase “the right
to be let alone.”43 Subsequently, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
proposed a right of privacy in an 1890 Harvard Law Review article,
written as a result of numerous attacks upon Warren’s family in the
press.44 The article traced the roots of the right of privacy back to the
common law of England.
However, the privacy protections proposed by Brandeis and War-
ren were more akin to what is now known as the tort of invasion of
privacy.45 Since the publication of their article, the term “right of pri-
                                                                                                                   
41. See Fla. S.B. 220 (1997); see also infra note 173 and accompanying text.
42. See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 54.
43. THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 29 (1st ed. 1880).
44. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
45. There are four types of privacy at issue in tort litigation, separate and apart from
the type of privacy at issue under the federal or Florida constitutions: (1) appropriation;
(2) intrusion; (3) public disclosure of private facts; and (4) false light in the public eye. See
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vacy” has evolved to encompass three distinct meanings, depending
upon the category of privacy law invoked: (1) a federal constitutional
right against governmental intrusion; (2) a state constitutional or
statutory right against either governmental or private intrusion; and
(3) the basis for an invasion of privacy civil action under tort law.46
A.   The Federal Constitutional Right of Privacy
Although there is no explicit right to privacy in the federal Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court has found a limited, implicit right to
privacy in that document. However, it was not until the United
States Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut ,47
that the Court used a substantive due process approach to read an
implicit right of privacy into the Constitution to protect a fundamen-
tal right.
In Griswold, the Court determined that married couples have the
right to use contraceptive devices. In so ruling, the Court noted that
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution encompasses various
“penumbras” or “zones” of privacy rights, including the First
Amendment right to privacy in one’s personal associations, the Third
Amendment prohibition on the quartering of soldiers in one’s home,
the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment privacy right against self-
incrimination.48 The Court then appeared to conclude that, under
this collection of rights, there dwells a general right of privacy as
well.49
Eventually, it became clear that this implicit privacy right pro-
tected three types of interests: (1) a person’s interest in decisional
autonomy on intimate personal matters; 50 (2) an individual’s interest
in protecting against the disclosure of personal matters;51 and (3) an
individual’s interest in being secure from unwarranted governmen-
tal surveillance and intrusion.52
In matters of personal autonomy, the right of privacy has been
limited to a penumbra of rights primarily involving the areas of per-
sonal decision making such as marriage, procreation, contraception,
                                                                                                                   
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971). For many
years Florida has recognized the right to sue in tort for the civil wrong of invasion of pri-
vacy. See Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); see also infra notes 131-37
and accompanying text.
46. See Forsberg v. Housing Auth. of the City of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 376
(Fla. 1984) (Overton, J., concurring).
47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. See id. at 484-85.
49. See id. at 485.
50. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 600 n.24.
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family relationships, and the rearing and education of children.53
Generally, protected autonomy rights may only be restricted if a
state establishes a compelling interest for which the restriction is
narrowly drawn.54 The most recent caselaw to generate significant
interest in this area is the United States Supreme Court’s consid-
eration of a right to “physician-assisted suicide,” in which the Court
refused to find an open-ended constitutional privacy right to such
assistance under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due
Process Clause.55
This same penumbra of rights presumably protects against the
public disclosure of private matters as well.56 In providing somewhat
superficial protection against disclosure, the Court has balanced the
personal right of privacy against the need for governmental intru-
sion rather than applying a compelling state interest test. The use of
this balancing test, however, has provided little, if any, protection in
cases brought before the Court.57 For instance, in Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services ,58 the Court determined that limited and
controlled disclosure of former President Nixon’s presidential papers
and tape recordings was not violative of his right to privacy.59 Like-
wise, in Whalen v. Roe,60 after finding sufficient safeguards to protect
individual privacy interests, the Court upheld a New York statute
that compelled disclosure to the government of names of persons re-
ceiving certain prescription drugs.61 In more recent cases, the Court
has discussed an individual’s interest in controlling the dissemina-
tion of information, but it has done so only in the statutory context of
cases involving the Freedom of Information Act.62
Additionally, the Court has clarified that the Fourth Amendment
protection against certain kinds of unreasonable governmental in-
trusion is distinct from other types of privacy rights.63 In specifically
                                                                                                                   
53. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
54. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
55. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct.
2293 (1997).
56. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).
57. See id.; see also Whalen 429 U.S. at 599-600 (finding that a state law requiring
doctors to report the dispensing of “dangerous drugs” did not violate a constitutionally
protected zone of privacy); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (finding that the police
chief did not violate an alleged shoplifter’s constitutionally protected right to privacy by
distributing a flyer identifying the plaintiff as a criminal).
58. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
59. See id. at 456.
60. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
61. See id. at 599-600.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), see, e.g., United States Dep’t of Def. v. Federal Lab. Rel.
Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994).
63. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that evidence collected by
the FBI through an electronic listening and recording device attached to the outside of a
telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment).
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distinguishing this right, the Court stated: “[T]he protection of a per-
son’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other peo-
ple—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual [s]tates.”64 This holding is ex-
tremely important because it grants states the primary responsibil-
ity of protecting their citizens against private intrusion. Accordingly,
any constitutional protections from intrusions by private persons or
commercial entities in the area of informational privacy in this new
age of technology will have to come from the states.
B.   The Florida Constitution’s Explicit Right of Privacy
1.   The Provision’s History
Given the limitations placed upon the implicit right to privacy
against government intrusion contained in the federal Constitution,
a few states, including Florida, began placing explicit privacy rights
in their state constitutions in order to afford additional protection to
their citizens.65 At the opening of the 1978 Constitution Revision
Commission, then Chief Justice Ben F. Overton suggested that the
adoption of an explicit right of privacy provision be addressed by the
Commission.66 Subsequently, an amendment securing a right to pri-
                                                                                                                   
64. Id. at 350-51 (footnotes omitted).
65. At the time Florida adopted its constitutional right to privacy, at least ten states,
including Florida, had some type of privacy provision in their constitution. However, all
but three states limited their right to privacy to issues involving search and seizure.
In addition to the explicit right of privacy contained in article I, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution, Florida citizens have also adopted a specific provision prohibiting unreason-
able searches and seizures similar to that contained in the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. That provision, however, grants
no additional protection against searches and seizures than that available under the fed-
eral constitution due to a 1982 amendment, which provides that section 12 shall be con-
strued in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. See Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988
(Fla. 1988).
66. Justice Overton noted the following in his opening remarks:
Another factor that should be recognized is that changes in our way of life
occur very rapidly. Thomas Jefferson said this country was “advancing rapidly
to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye.” That quotation is very true in this
day and time. Our technological advancements continue to surpass our imagi-
nation, but our political and economic problems also are increased with this
advancement.
Ten years ago no one knew that shortly we would have a great national con-
cern about energy and its control.
And who, ten years ago, really understood that personal and financial data
on a substantial part of our population could be collected by government or
business and held for easy distribution by computer operated information sys-
tems? There is a public concern about how personal information concerning an
individual citizen is used, whether it be collected by government or by busi-
ness. The subject of individual privacy and privacy law is in a developing
stage. [A number of] states have adopted some form of privacy legislation, and
many appellate courts in this nation now have substantial right of privacy is-
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vacy was drafted, debated, and approved by the 1978 Constitution
Revision Commission and placed on the ballot together with a num-
ber of other proposed constitutional amendments.67 The Commis-
sion’s proposed amendment package was defeated by the people.
Nevertheless, interest in the adoption of a privacy provision contin-
ued. Two years later, the Legislature, believing that there was still
considerable public interest in a privacy provision, enacted a joint
resolution to place a privacy provision before the public for a vote.68
This time the provision was adopted.
2.   The Provision Itself
The first sentence of section 23 provides that “[e]very natural per-
son has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intru-
sion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein .”69 These
words provide the courts with specific guidance as to how this provi-
sion is to be applied.
First, the provision protects every “natural person.” The Florida
Supreme Court has concluded that this term extends the provision’s
protection to all Floridians, even to minors.70
Second, for the provision to be applicable, there must be
“governmental intrusion.” This is crucial to the application of the
provision. Confusion exists because some believe that this provision
applies to all intrusions against privacy. This language makes it
                                                                                                                   
sues before them for consideration. It is a new problem that should be ad-
dressed.
CHIEF JUSTICE BEN F. OVERTON, REPORT TO THE CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION 2-3
(1977) (on file with FLA. ST. U. L. REV., Tallahassee, Fla.); see also Gerald B. Cope, Jr.,
Note, To Be Let Alone: Florida’s Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 674
(1978).
67. The proposed provision as drafted by the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission
read as follows:
Section 23. Right of privacy.—Every natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as oth-
erwise provided herein.
WEST PUBLISING CO., PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION 8 (1978) (on file
with the Florida Supreme Court Library and the FLA. ST. U. L. REV., Tallahassee, Fla.).
68. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 387 (Reg. Sess. 1980) (proposing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
The official ballot analysis of the proposed amendment provided as follows: “[p]roposing
the creation of Section 23 of Article I of the State Constitution establishing a constitu-
tional right of privacy.” Id. No official analysis other than this summary was included in
the resolution. The joint resolution was enacted through the efforts of then Representative
Jon L. Mills and other members of the Legislature.
69. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (emphasis added).
70. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (extending privacy rights involving
abortion to minors); B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995) (protecting a minor’s decision
to have consensual sex). The right to privacy also belongs to persons who are incompetent.
See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (extending the right of pri-
vacy to refuse medical treatment to persons who have requested that medical treatment
be discontinued prior to becoming incompetent).
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clear that there must be state action before the provision’s protec-
tions are available. Additionally, this governmental intrusion must
be into the “private,” not public, life of an individual.
The Florida Supreme Court has determined, however, that an
individual is not protected against all governmental intrusion. As
the Court stated in the first case in which this provision was inter-
preted, Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant ,71 the rights
provided under section 23 are circumscribed and limited by the cir-
cumstances under which they are asserted. The court stated that
section 23 does not guarantee that there will be no intrusion by gov-
ernment; it simply guarantees against intrusions into areas where
an individual has a legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy.72
For instance, although individuals may possess obscene material in
their homes, there is “no legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy
in being able to patronize retail establishments for the purpose of
purchasing such material.”73 Likewise, the decision to use one’s land
in a manner contrary to a lawful public environmental policy is not a
private act in which one has a legitimate expectation of privacy.74
The last portion of the first sentence of the constitutional provi-
sion, “except as otherwise provided herein,” was added to ensure
that there would be no adverse effect on law enforcement by the ad-
dition of this amendment. Specifically, the court has recognized that
the provision does not modify the search and seizure provision of ar-
ticle I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution, now required to be in-
terpreted in conformity with Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the Fourth Amendment.75
The final sentence in section 23, stating that the provision is not
to be construed to limit Florida’s “Sunshine” or open government re-
cords and meetings laws, was included to assure that the provision
would not be interpreted to limit the existing statutory Sunshine
laws.76 Originally, open records and meeting laws passed by the
Legislature did not apply to the judiciary.77 Nevertheless, the Florida
Supreme Court found in Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers,
                                                                                                                   
71. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983) (holding that the Board of Bar Examiners requirement
that all medical records, including records of psychological treatment, be disclosed was the
least intrusive means to achieve a compelling state interest and was, therefore, constitu-
tional).
72. See id. at 74.
73. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990).
74. See Department of Comm’y Aff. v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 933 (Fla. 1995)
(holding that the right to privacy was not implicated by an ordinance prohibiting the
erection of fences in specified areas in order to protect an endangered species of deer).
75. See State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla. 1991); State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d
185, 188 (Fla. 1987).
76. See FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1995).
77. See Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995) (finding that judicial
records are not subject to chapter 119, Florida Statutes).
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Inc.,78 that a strong presumption of public access to court proceed-
ings and records existed, but concluded that, under certain circum-
stances, the provision could constitute a basis for disallowing access.
Specifically, the court determined that section 23 was applicable
where closure of records and proceedings was necessary to avoid
substantial injury to innocent third parties, or to avoid substantial
injury to a party by disclosure of matters protected by a privacy right
not generally inherent in the specific type of civil proceeding sought
to be closed.79 Likewise, in Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc. v. Doe ,80 the
court applied this same standard to the disclosure of the names and
addresses of individuals contained in a prostitute’s client list. The
court determined, however, that “[t]he privacy amendment has not
been interpreted to protect names and addresses contained in public
records,” and refused to provide protection to those on the list who
were part of the public records of the court proceeding.81
In 1992, article I, section 24, was adopted.82 That provision codi-
fied much of the public record and meeting statutes into a constitu-
                                                                                                                   
78. 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988).
79. See id. at 118.
80. 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
81. Id. at 552.
82. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24:
Section 24. Access to public records and meetings—
(a) Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or re-
ceived in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or
employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to
records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by
this Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government and each agency or department created
thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional of-
ficer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Consti-
tution.
(b) All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of state
government or of any collegial public body of a county, municipality, school
district, or special district, at which official acts are to be taken or at which
public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed, shall be open and
noticed to the public and meetings of the legislature shall be open and noticed
as provided in Article III, Section 4(e), except with respect to meetings ex-
empted pursuant to this section or specifically closed by this Constitution.
(c) This section shall be self-executing. The legislature, however, may provide
by general law for the exemption of records from the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) and the exemption of meetings from the requirements of subsection (b),
provided that such law shall state with specificity the public necessity justify-
ing the exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to accomplish the
stated purpose of the law. The legislature shall enact laws governing the en-
forcement of this section, including the maintenance, control, destruction, dis-
posal, and disposition of records made public by this section, except that each
house of the legislature may adopt rules governing the enforcement of this
section in relation to records of the legislative branch. Laws enacted pursuant
to this subsection shall contain only exemptions from the requirements of sub-
sections (a) or (b) and provisions governing the enforcement of this section, and
shall relate to one subject.
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tional provision and extended government in the sunshine to the re-
cords of the judicial branch. Under the exception authority contained
in section 24, many of the exceptions to disclosure articulated in
Barron and other cases retain protection through Florida Rule of
Judicial Administration 2.050.83 As yet, it has not been determined
how the adoption of section 24 will affect cases construing the pri-
vacy provision contained in article I, section 23.
3.   The Standard to be Applied
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Winfield v. Division of
Pari-Mutuel Wagering 84 set forth the standard to be used in applying
section 23. In Winfield, the court stated that the right to privacy un-
der section 23 is “fundamental” and, once implicated, must be evalu-
ated using a compelling state interest standard.85 The importance of
this case cannot be overstated. It clarifies that once an individual
has established that government has intruded into a private aspect
of the individual’s life, government must show that it has a compel-
ling interest to justify the intrusion, and that it has employed the
least intrusive means possible to accomplish its objective.86
Section 23 has been part of Florida’s Constitution for over fifteen
years and has generated a significant amount of case law. Essen-
tially, cases construing section 23 can be divided into two categories:
those involving personal autonomy and those involving the disclo-
sure of information.
4.   Personal Autonomy Cases
Clearly, section 23 has had its greatest effect on Floridians in the
area of personal autonomy protection. One of the most important
cases under this provision is the decision of In re T.W.,87 in which the
Florida Supreme Court determined that a woman’s right to an abor-
tion will be protected under the compelling state interest standard
regardless of whether such a right is protected under the Constitu-
tion.88 The court made it clear that even if the Supreme Court were
to overrule its decision in Roe v. Wade,89 which, at the time article 23
                                                                                                                   
(d) All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access to records
or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records of the legis-
lative and judicial branches, until they are repealed. Rules of court that are in
effect on the date of adoption of this section that limit access to records shall
remain in effect until they are repealed.
83. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.050.
84. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
85. See id. at 547.
86. See id.
87. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
88. See id. at 1195.
89. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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was adopted, set forth the principles governing the right to an abor-
tion, the right to an abortion would still be protected under the pri-
vacy provision in the Florida Constitution.
Equally as important, section 23 has been read to provide indi-
viduals with the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, including
food and water.90 This is often refered to as a “right to die with dig-
nity.”91 In fact, a Florida district court has determined that a physi-
cian who imposes life-sustaining treatment on an individual who has
competently rejected such treatment can be held both civilly and
criminally liable.92
Furthermore, a mother can refuse life-sustaining treatment even
if she has small children.93 Although the court has stated that the
right to refuse treatment may be made either orally or in writing,
given the inherent difficulties in proving an oral declaration, most
individuals today who wish to forego life-sustaining treatment are
encouraged to sign “living wills,” which provide details, in writing, of
their wishes in the face of such circumstances.94
However, the Florida Supreme Court recently determined that
the right to privacy does not encompass a right to physician-assisted
suicide because the state has a compelling interest in protecting
life.95
5.   Disclosure of Personal Information
Although the Florida Supreme Court provides greater protection
to individual personal autonomy, it has been somewhat reluctant to
do so when the disclosure of personal information is at stake, par-
ticularly where the disclosure involves public entities or officials.
Prior to the adoption of the privacy amendment, the court was asked
to recognize a federal or state right of privacy prohibiting disclosure
of personal information contained in applications for high-level gov-
ernment employment.96 First, the court found that public interest in
accessing employment applications to satisfy public accountability
outweighed any federal privacy interest.97 The court then rejected
the proposition that Florida’s Constitution contained a right of dis-
closural privacy that would govern these circumstances. 98
                                                                                                                   
90. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
91. John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 617 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1983).
92. See Rodriquez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
93. See In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
94. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765 (1995); see also Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
95. See Krischer v. McIver, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S443 (Fla. 1997).
96. See Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
1980).
97. See id. at 638.
98. See id. at 639.
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However, even after the adoption of the privacy amendment, the
court has been constrained, in light of the specific restriction on
public records, to provide protection regarding the disclosure of such
information. When such information is not contained in a so-called
“public record,” the court has been cautious in protecting the disclo-
sure of personal information.
For example, in the City of North Miami v. Kurtz ,99 an individual
claimed a constitutional right of privacy protecting her from disclos-
ing whether she was a smoker on a government job application. The
government entity involved had a smoke-free workplace and was a
self-insurer providing one hundred percent health insurance cover-
age for its employees.100 The court held that, under those circum-
stances, the job applicant did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy regarding the individual’s smoking habits, given that indi-
viduals divulge such information in almost every area of their lives,
such as when renting a car or a motel room, or when being seated in
a restaurant.101
Likewise, the court determined in Florida Board of Bar Exami n-
ers Re: Applicant102 that the state has a compelling interest in requir-
ing a bar applicant to disclose psychiatric treatment history, and in
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 103 that the state has a
compelling interest in the need to examine bank records in a pari-
mutuel wagering investigation. The court determined in Rasmussen
v. South Florida Blood Service, Inc. 104 that confidential donor infor-
mation concerning an AIDS-tainted blood supply was afforded pro-
tection under section 23. Additionally, in Shaktman v. State ,105 the
court afforded protection against the use of pen registers106 without
prior judicial approval.
In 1996, the Court was asked in Resha v. Tucker107 to determine
whether a violation of section 23 gives rise to money damages. Al-
though money damages are available in general tort privacy ac-
tions,108 the court declined to reach this issue as it applies to section
23. Thus, the question remains unanswered.
                                                                                                                   
99. 653 So. 2d 1025 (1995).
100. See id. at 1026-27.
101. See id. at 1028.
102. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
103. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
104. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
105. 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989).
106. See id. at 149 n.3 (“[A pen register is] a device which records or decodes electronic
or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the tele-
phone line to which such device is attached . . . .”); FLA. STAT. § 934.02(20) (1995).
107. 670 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1996).
108. See infra notes 109-39 and accompanying text (discussing general civil privacy
torts).
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6.   Summation
Article I, section 23 affords greater protection from government
intrusion than the federal Constitution. The privacy right is explicit,
it extends to all aspects of an individual’s private life rather than
simply extending to some elusive “penumbra” of rights, and it en-
sures that the state cannot intrude into an individual’s private life
absent a compelling interest. However, the provision provides no
protection from private or commercial intrusion because the present
provision is limited to governmental intrusions. As explained previ-
ously, we are no longer limited in our privacy concerns to invasions
by big brother; the commercial invasions by the private sector may
well be the biggest threats to our privacy today.
C.   Privacy as a Basis for Tort Action
Many jurisdictions have several methods, not constitutionally
based, for bringing civil privacy invasion actions against private in-
dividuals and commercial entities. Essentially, there are four types
of privacy actions existing in tort litigation separate and apart from
the type of privacy at issue under the federal Constitution or article
I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution.  The four types of privacy
actions include: (1) appropriation, involving the unauthorized use of
a person’s name or likeness; (2) intrusion, involving physical or elec-
tronic intrusion into one’s private quarters; (3) public disclosure of
private facts, involving the dissemination of truthful private infor-
mation that a reasonable person would find objectionable; and (4)
false light in the public eye, involving the publication of facts that
place a person in a false light even though the facts themselves may
not be defamatory.109 All of these actions are tied together by the
common thread of privacy, but otherwise they have little in com-
mon.110
1.   Appropriation
Appropriation was the first privacy tort recognized by the
courts.111 A plaintiff must show that the defendant appropriated the
plaintiff’s name or identity for some advantage, usually of a com-
mercial nature.112 For example, appropriation would occur if a defen-
dant used a plaintiff’s name, picture, or other likeness to advertise a
defendant’s product or to accompany an article sold, without the con-
                                                                                                                   
109. See PROSSER, supra note 45, at § 117.
110. See id. § 117, at 804.
111. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117,
at 851 (5th ed. 1984).
112. See DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 6.2, at 380 (1991).
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sent of the plaintiff.113 To be actionable, the plaintiff must be identi-
fiable, the defendant must appropriate the name or likeness for his
or her own advantage, and the appropriation must be without the
plaintiff’s consent.114
2.   Intrusion
Intrusion involves “the unreasonable and highly offensive intru-
sion upon the seclusion of another.”115 An intrusion upon seclusion
most accurately represents the right to be left alone.116 To determine
whether an intrusion is actionable, a court must weigh the public in-
terest of releasing the information against the plaintiff’s privacy in-
terests.117 The standard is similar to the constitutional prohibitions
against the disclosure of information. Examples of intrusion include
the illegal diversion or interception and opening of one’s mail, peep-
ing into one’s home, the viewing of a department store’s changing
room by someone of the opposite sex where no adequate notice has
been provided, persistent and unwanted telephone calls, wiretap-
ping, or prying into a plaintiff’s bank account.118 To be actionable, the
intrusion must be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person,
and the thing intruded upon must be private.119 Under this tort, a
plaintiff can receive damages and/or injunctive relief.120
3.   Public Disclosure of Private Facts
While closely akin to the tort of defamation, the tort of public dis-
closure of private facts provides additional relief not normally avail-
able through the tort of defamation. For instance, neither truth nor
lack of malice is generally a defense to the tort of public disclosure of
private facts.121 The plaintiff must allege that facts were made public
that would normally kept hidden from the public eye.122 Moreover,
the facts disclosed must be facts that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.123 However, as with the tort of defamation, the
court must apply a balancing test and weigh the public interest in
having the information made available against the right of pri-
vacy.124
                                                                                                                   
113. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 117, at 852.
114. See id. § 117, at 852-54.
115. Id. § 117, at 854.
116. See ELDER, supra note 112, § 2.1, at 16.
117. See id. § 2.1, at 16-17.
118. See id. §§ 2.4-2.5; KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 117, at 855.
119. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 117, at 855.
120. See ELDER, supra note 112, § 2.10, at 57; id. § 2.11, at 64.
121. See id. § 3.1, at 150.
122. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 117, at 856-57.
123. See id.
124. See id. § 117, at 856-57, 863.
1997]                         RIGHT OF PRIVACY 43
4.   False Light in the Public Eye
False light in the public eye substantially overlaps with the tort of
defamation.125 Generally, an action can be brought for defamation
and false light, but recovery can be had only once.126 The benefit of
bringing an action in false light is that the publication must be false
but need not be defamatory.127 To succeed in an action for false light,
the plaintiff must prove that the information is false, that there is
widespread publication of the information, that the plaintiff is iden-
tifiable, and that the information published is highly offensive under
the reasonable person standard.128
In Time, Inc. v. Hill ,129 the Supreme Court included false light in
the constitutional privilege of freedom of the press. Thus, absent a
showing that the defendant made the false statements with knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, no cause of action
will lie.130
5.   The Privacy Torts in Florida
Florida recognizes the right to sue in tort for the civil wrong of in-
vasion of privacy. In the relatively infamous case of Cason v.
Baskin,131 which involved Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings’ book Cross
Creek, the Florida Supreme Court held that an action for invasion of
the right of privacy was cognizable in Florida.132 The court, however,
emphasized that the right of privacy is limited:
[T]he right of privacy has its limitations. Society also has its
rights. The right of the general public to the dissemination of news
and information must be protected and conserved. Freedom of
speech and of the press must be protected. Section 13 of our Decla-
ration of Rights reads in part as follows: “Every person may fully
speak and write his sentiments on all subjects being responsible
for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.”133
In Cason, Zelma Cason sued Rawlings for including Zelma as a
character in her book.134 The court stated that a cause of action
would lie if Cason could establish lack of consent and publication of
                                                                                                                   
125. See id. § 117, at 864 (stating that false light is often defamatory).
126. See ELDER, supra note 112, § 4.1, at 261.
127. See id. § 4.2, at 270.
128. See id.; id. § 4.3, at 274; id. § 4.4, at 282.
129. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
130. See id. at 389-90.
131. 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944).
132. See id. at 250-51.
133. Id. at 251.
134. See id. at 244-45.
44 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:25
information that would offend a reasonable man.135 The court also
concluded that the information must not be of legitimate public or
general interest and that malice was not required.136 While not spe-
cifically identifying the type of tort at issue, the court was clearly
addressing the tort of public disclosure of private facts. Since the
court issued its decision in Cason, Florida courts have continued to
recognize the invasion of privacy torts.137
6.   The Privacy Torts and Technological Privacy Invasions
Like the constitutional privacy protections, actionable privacy
torts rarely involve the type of privacy invasions at issue in the in-
formation age. In fact, none of the privacy torts is likely to provide
relief for the unauthorized commercial sale or compilation of per-
sonal information.
For example, while the tort of intrusion upon seclusion may pro-
vide relief in situations where a camera has been placed in a public
dressing room,138 it is unlikely to provide relief to one whose infor-
mation was taken from a public record or from the voluntary use of a
commercial service. Intrusion will not provide relief because the sale
or compilation of public information may not be highly offensive or
an intrusion into a private matter.
Furthermore, under public disclosure of private facts, the disclo-
sure may be highly offensive but would not qualify as “wide dissemi-
nation” because the defendant took the information from a public re-
cord or commercial service. Similarly, the disclosure would not qual-
ify under false light in the public eye because, while the information
may be false, it has probably not been widely disseminated.
The tort of appropriation might provide more satisfactory relief.
Clearly, appropriation evolved to provide protection against the
commercial exploitation of one’s name or likeness. However, this tort
generally provides relief in the area of advertising rather than in the
area of data collection and sales.139
                                                                                                                   
135. See id. at 251.
136. See id. at 251-53.
137. See, e.g., Resha v. Tucker, 670 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. 1996); Cape Pub., Inc. v. Hitch-
ner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989); Forsberg v. Housing Auth. of the City of Miami
Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 374 (Overton, J., concurring).
138. See ELDER, supra note 112, § 2.5, at 40.
139. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 30:20, at 913-16
(1991).
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D.   Statutory Law
1.   Federal Law
Throughout the last several decades, Congress has enacted a
number of laws in an attempt to address invasions of privacy. In
1970, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act,140 allowing in-
dividuals to inspect and correct their credit records and preventing
the disclosure of information to others absent a “legitimate business
need.”141 Unfortunately, the exception has almost swallowed the rule;
almost anything can be characterized as a legitimate business need.
Moreover, credit bureau terminals are now in thousands of sites, in-
cluding car dealerships, real estate offices, and banks, providing
easy access for information resellers.142 According to one source, no
one has ever been prosecuted for illegally obtaining credit reports.143
In 1974, Congress passed the Privacy Act,144 which applies to the
protection of federal government records. The Act forbids the federal
government from maintaining secret data banks and requires the in-
formation collected about U.S. citizens to be kept confidential. How-
ever, the Act has been characterized as “horribly botched.”145
In 1974, Congress passed the Family Education Rights and Pri-
vacy Act.146 The purpose of the Act was to ensure access to education
records for students and parents while protecting the privacy of
those records.147
The Right to Financial Privacy Act148 was passed in 1978 to pro-
hibit the federal government from examining bank account records
without consent or a warrant. Ironically, while tightening federal
government access to bank records, the Act purportedly loosened the
overall safeguards on bank files.149
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, prohibiting government and law enforcement from monitoring
messages sent via public electronic mail.150 Like previous privacy
acts, this Act contains many exceptions to the general rule forbid-
ding the interception of electronic communication agencies.
                                                                                                                   
140. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(E) (1994).
142. See Jeffrey Rothfeder, Invasion of Privacy, PC WORLD, Nov. 1995, at 152
[hereinafter Invasion of Privacy].
143. See id.
144. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994)).
145. ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 125.
146. See Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994)).
147. See Student Press Law Ctr. v. Alexander, 778 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (D.D.C. 1991).
148. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994)).
149. See ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 26-27.
150. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994)).
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The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988151 was passed to ban re-
tailers from disclosing the titles of movies rented by customers as a
result of the Robert Bork Supreme Court nomination proceedings.
However, the Act does not prevent the disclosure of the genre of
movies the customer rents.152
All of these acts address privacy rights in a fairly piecemeal
fashion and all appear to contain a number of exceptions. Addition-
ally, enforcement of these protections is frequently a problem.
Recognizing that further legislation is necessary to provide ade-
quate protection, a number of proposals are currently under consid-
eration. For example, in 1995, the Federal Trade Commission met to
examine issues dealing with technology and privacy and has an-
nounced that it intends to develop self-regulatory privacy principles
for on-line spaces.153 However, the principles will apparently be vol-
untary. Furthermore, a number of bills are currently pending before
Congress to protect privacy interests,154 including the Internet Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1997;155 the Fair Health Information Practices
Act of 1997;156 the Postal Privacy Act of 1997;157 the Genetic Privacy
and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997;158 and the Commission to Study
the Federal Statistical System Act of 1997.159
In summary, it is clear that a number of federal laws exist to
provide protection in the area of privacy. However, in practice most
have not provided much protection.
2.   Florida Law
While privacy involving the disclosure of personal information
has been at issue on a federal level for some time, Florida has been
somewhat less aggressive in this area. The term “privacy” is refer-
enced in at least seventy-two Florida statutory provisions. However,
Florida laws provide limited protection because most of the refer-
ences to privacy are non-substantive, referring simply to protecting
the type of personal privacy involved in the taking of a urine test160
                                                                                                                   
151. Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1992)).
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii) (1994).
153. See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 70; O’Malley, supra note 18, at 58.
154. See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center (visited July 13, 1997)
<http://www.epic.org/> (providing current information on proposed federal legislation re-
garding privacy interests).
155. H.R. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
156. H.R. 52, 105th Cong. (1997).
157. H.R. 49, 105th Cong. (1997).
158. H.R. 341, 105th Cong. (1997).
159. S. 144, 105th Cong. (1997).
160. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.0455(8)(a) (1995) (“A sample shall be collected with due
regard to the privacy of the individual providing the sample . . . .”).
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or in the provision of medical care.161 Additionally, a few, while not
specifically referring to the term “privacy,” do prohibit the disclosure
of certain records. For instance, hospital medical records cannot be
released without a patient’s consent.162
Florida has also codified the common law privacy tort of appro-
priation.163 Florida law prohibits the use of one’s name or likeness for
                                                                                                                   
161. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 381.026(4)(a)(2) (1995) (“Every patient who is provided
health care services retains certain rights to privacy, which must be respected without re-
gard to the patient’s economic status or source of payment for his care.”).
162. See FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(4) (1995) (“Patient records shall be confidential and
shall not be disclosed without the consent of the person to whom they pertain . . . .”).
163. See FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1995):
(1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for pur-
poses of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait,
photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without the express writ-
ten or oral consent to such use given by:
(a) Such person; or
(b) Any other person, firm or corporation authorized in writing by such person
to license the commercial use of his name or likeness; or
(c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm or corporation authorized in
writing to license the commercial use of his name or likeness, or if no person,
firm or corporation is so authorized, then by any one from among a class com-
posed of his surviving spouse and surviving children.
(2) In the event the consent required in subsection (1) is not obtained, the per-
son whose name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness is so used, or any per-
son, firm, or corporation authorized by such person in writing to license the
commercial use of his name or likeness, or, if the person whose likeness is
used is deceased, any person, firm, or corporation having the right to give such
consent, as provided hereinabove, may bring an action to enjoin such unau-
thorized publication, printing, display or other public use, and to recover dam-
ages for any loss or injury sustained by reason thereof, including an amount
which would have been a reasonable royalty, and punitive or exemplary dam-
ages.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to:
(a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of any
person in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other
news medium or publication as part of any bona fide news report or presenta-
tion having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name or
likeness is not used for advertising purposes;
(b) The use of such name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness in connection
with the resale or other distribution of literary, musical, or artistic productions
or other articles of merchandise or property where such person has consented
to the use of his name, portrait, photograph, or likeness on or in connection
with the initial sale or distribution thereof; or
(c) Any photograph of a person solely as a member of the public and where
such person is not named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the
use of such photograph.
(4) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any publication,
printing, display, or other public use of the name or likeness of a person oc-
curring after the expiration of 40 years from and after the death of such per-
son.
(5) As used in this section, a person’s “surviving spouse” is the person’s surviv-
ing spouse under the law of his domicile at the time of his death, whether or
not the spouse has later remarried; and a person’s “children” are his immedi-
ate offspring and any children legally adopted by him. Any consent provided
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trade, commercial or advertising purposes. Like the common law
tort, the statute is designed to prevent the unauthorized use of a
name to directly promote the product or service of the publisher.164
Because the statute protects the appropriation of private information
for the purpose of advertising, the statute will probably not provide
any protection for invasions of privacy due to distribution for data
matching and marketing purposes. In fact, at least one consumer has
attempted to prohibit the sale of personal information by bringing a
suit under a similar Virginia statute. 165 Predictably, the suit was
unsuccessful.
Additionally, Florida has criminalized wiretapping166 and tele-
phone harassment.167 While these statutes may prohibit the monitor-
ing of electronic conversations, they do little to protect against the
collection and distribution of information for commercial purposes.
Interestingly, Florida’s change of name statute briefly references
privacy as a property right.168 The statutes also reference a right to
                                                                                                                   
for in subsection (1) shall be given on behalf of a minor by the guardian of his
person or by either parent.
(6) The remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in
limitation of the remedies and rights of any person under the common law
against the invasion of his privacy.
164. See Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 622-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
165. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1996). In 1995, Ram Avrahami sued U.S.
News & World Report, Inc., after he subscribed to that publication, and it thereafter
“rented” his name to the Smithsonian Institution. See Avrahami v. U.S. News & World
Report, Inc., No. 95-7479 (Gen. Dist. Ct. of Arlington Co., Va. July 21, 1995) (available at
<http://www.epic.org/privacy/junk_mail/motion.html>). Relief was also sought under a
cause of action for conversion, the plaintiff claiming that he had a property right in his
name and that the publication had exercised dominion over that property without his
permission. The trial court denied relief and subsequent appeals of that decision were un-
successful. See Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., No. 961837 (Va. 1996), reh’g
denied (Va. 1996) (on file with author).
166. See FLA. STAT. § 934.01(2)(1995). The Legislature found that:
[i]n order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to
protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings, and to prevent
the obstruction of intrastate commerce, it is necessary for the Legislature to
define the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire
and oral communications may be authorized and to prohibit any unauthorized
interception of such communications and the use of the contents thereof in
evidence in courts and administrative proceedings.
167. See FLA. STAT. § 365.16(a) (1995):
[Anyone who m]akes a telephone call to a location at which the person receiv-
ing the call has a reasonable expectation of privacy; during such call makes
any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivi-
ous, filthy, vulgar, or indecent; and by such call or such language intends to of-
fend, annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number; . . . is
guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082 or s. 775.083.
168. See FLA. STAT. § 68.07(j) (1995) (“[t]hat the petition is filed for no ulterior or ille-
gal purpose and granting it will not in any manner invade the property rights of others,
whether partnership, patent, good will, privacy, trademark or otherwise.”) (emphasis
added).
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privacy in deciding whether to register to vote,169 in creating a tax-
payer’s bill of rights,170 and obtaining access to school records.171
Nevertheless, none of these statutes provide significant protection in
the area of privacy. In fact, some statutory provisions specifically
protect individuals who provide private information to others. For
instance, in the statute governing the cancellation of insurance poli-
cies, the statute specifically provides that:
No cause of action in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy,
or negligence shall arise against any person for disclosing personal
or privileged information in accordance with this section, nor shall
such a cause of action arise against any person for furnishing per-
sonal or privileged information to an insurance institution, agent,
or insurance-support organization; however, this section shall
provide no immunity for disclosing or furnishing false information
through gross negligence or with malice or willful intent to injure
any person.172
Recently, a bill entitled “An act relating to information manage-
ment”173 was proposed to allow companies to obtain information be-
longing to Florida’s governmental entities, which the companies
could then use for commercial purposes. The bill would have created
a new Florida Information Council and would have dramatically
changed how the public gains access to electronically formatted in-
formation.174 Because the bill allowed the information to be accessed
for a fee based on market rates, the bill would have commercialized
public records.175 Fortunately, the bill died in committee. It reflects,
however, the need for added protections against such laws in the fu-
                                                                                                                   
169. See FLA. STAT. § 97.058(2)(e) (1995):
If you believe that someone has interfered with your right to register or to
decline to register to vote, your right to privacy in deciding whether to register
or in applying to register to vote, or your right to choose your own political
party or other political preference, you may file a complaint with the Secretary
of State.
170. See FLA. STAT. § 213.015 (1995):
There is created a Florida Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights to guarantee that the
rights, privacy, and property of Florida taxpayers are adequately safeguarded
and protected during tax assessment, collection, and enforcement processes
administered under the revenue laws of this state. The Taxpayer’s Bill of
Rights compiles, in one document, brief but comprehensive statements which
explain, in simple, nontechnical terms, the rights and obligations of the De-
partment of Revenue and taxpayers. The rights afforded taxpayers to assure
that their privacy and property are safeguarded and protected during tax as-
sessment and collection are available only insofar as they are implemented in
other parts of the Florida Statutes or rules of the Department of Revenue.
(emphasis added).
171. See FLA. STAT. § 228.093(1) (1995).
172. FLA. STAT. § 627.4091(3) (1995).
173. Fla. SB 220 (1997).
174. See id. § 1(2).
175. See id.
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ture. In sum, Florida laws, both present and proposed, generally
provide even less protection than that afforded through federal laws.
3.   Laws of Other States
Like Florida, many states have yet to adopt laws to address the
protection of informational privacy in the age of technology. While
some are considering such laws or have established committees to
study the issue, most of the existing or proposed laws are limited to
the realm of information collected by governmental agencies. For in-
stance, Wisconsin created a joint committee on information policy to
review information management and technology systems, plans,
practices, and policies of state and local governments, including the
“protection of the personal privacy of individuals who are subjects of
data bases of state and local governmental agencies and their provi-
sion of access to public records.”176
Interestingly, since 1977 Californians have been protected by the
Information Practices Act,177 which states:
The Legislature declares that the right to privacy is a personal and
fundamental right protected by Section 1 of Article I of the Consti-
tution of California and by the United States Constitution and that
all individuals have a right of privacy in information pertaining to
them. The Legislature further makes the following findings:
(a) The right to privacy is being threatened by the indiscriminate
collection, maintenance, and dissemination of personal information
and the lack of effective laws and legal remedies.
(b) The increasing use of computers and other sophisticated infor-
mation technology has greatly magnified the potential risk to in-
dividual privacy that can occur from the maintenance of personal
information.
(c) In order to protect the privacy of individuals, it is necessary
that the maintenance and dissemination of personal information
be subject to strict limits.178
Unfortunately, the term “personal information” is defined as “any in-
formation that is maintained by an agency.”179 Thus, as in Florida,
the provision does not provide relief for personal information col-
lected by non-governmental entities.
Minnesota recently had the opportunity to become the “first
[state] in the nation to broadly regulate the use of ‘personally identi-
fiable information’ via online services.”180 A bill considered by the
1996 Minnesota Legislature would have limited the information on-
                                                                                                                   
176. WIS. STAT. § 13.58(5)(a)(1) (1995).
177. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798-1798.76 (West 1995).
178. Id. § 1798.1.
179. Id. § 1798.3(a) (emphasis added).
180. O’Malley, supra note 18, at 58-59.
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line services could collect and would have prohibited the disclosure
of that information absent consent of the consumer.181 The bill was
not enacted.
4.   International Law
Although attempts at providing information privacy protection in
the United States have been relatively piecemeal and somewhat
limited, international efforts have been more successful. Europe has
developed the European Union Directive on the Protection of Per-
sonal Data.182 This directive will become effective in 1998 and com-
prises a framework of individual rights and information practices.
The directive includes fair information practices, requires data sub-
jects to be given notice of the processing of their personal informa-
tion and an opportunity to decide how that information will be used,
provides the right of access to personal data, and provides for judi-
cial remedies and the right to compensation for violations.183 Because
the directive also places restrictions on the transfer of personal in-
formation from European countries to jurisdictions that lack ade-
quate levels of privacy protection, participants in a Federal Trade
Commission study have indicated that it may have an adverse effect
on the flow of information between the United States and other
countries.184
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has
also developed an internationally recognized set of privacy principles
known as the Code of Fair Information Practices.185 These principles
are as follows:
· Only the information that is really needed should be collected.
· Where possible, it should be collected directly from the indi-
vidual to whom it pertains (the data subject).
· The data subject should be told why the information is needed.
· The information should be used only for the intended purpose.
· The information should not be used for other (secondary) pur-
poses without the data subject’s consent.
· Data subjects should be given the opportunity to see their per-
sonal information and correct it if it’s wrong.186
                                                                                                                   
181. See 1995 Minn. H.F. 2816, 79th Leg. (1995).
182. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oc-
tober 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Eur. O.J. L281/31 (Nov. 23, 1995) (available at
<http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/dataprot/directiv/directiv.html>).
183. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER
PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTUCTURE App. B (1996).
184. See id.; see also Stanley, supra note 3, at 25.
185. See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 25.
186. Id.
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Likewise, the Canadian Standards Association has developed a
set of privacy principles that provide guidelines promoting account-
ability and consent.187 These guidelines are voluntary and provide no
mechanism for enforcement.
However, Quebec has adopted mandatory privacy legislation,
making it the first jurisdiction in North America to extend the right
of privacy from the public sector to the private sector.188 Quebec’s
legislation, an Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information
in the Private Sector, became effective January 1, 1994. The Act
applies to almost any type of information, requires clear and under-
standable opt-out provisions for consumers, and provides investiga-
tive and dispute-resolution powers to a commission.189
                                                                                                                   
187. The Canadian Standards Association’s Privacy Principles are as follows:
ACCOUNTABILITY  An organization is responsible for personal information
under its control and shall designate an individual or individuals who are ac-
countable for the organization’s compliance with the following principles.
IDENTIFYING PURPOSES  The purposes for which personal information is
collected shall be identified by the organization at or before the time the in-
formation is collected.
CONSENT  The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropri-
ate.
LIMITING COLLECTION  The collection of personal information shall be
limited to that which is necessary for the purposes identified by the organiza-
tion. Information shall be collected by fair and lawful means.
LIMITING USE, DISCLOSURE, AND RETENTION  Personal information
shall not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it was
collected, except with the consent of the individual or as required by law. Per-
sonal information shall be retained only as long as necessary for the fulfil-
ment of those purposes.
ACCURACY  Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up to
date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used.
SAFEGUARDS  Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards
appropriate to the sensitivity of the information.
OPENNESS  An organization shall make readily available to individuals spe-
cific information about its policies and practices relating to the management of
personal information.
INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the
existence, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information, and shall be
given access to that information. An individual shall be able to challenge the
accuracy and completeness of the information and have it amended as appro-
priate.
CHALLENGING COMPLIANCE  An individual shall be able to address a
challenge concerning compliance with the above principles to the designated
individual or individuals accountable for the organization’s compliance.
McKendry, supra note 19, at 19.
188. See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 186.
189. See McKendry, supra note 19, at 18; CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at
187-90.
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IV.   SOLUTIONS
Florida has long been a proponent of government in the sunshine
and access to public records.190 The policy reasons for openness rest
in the essential principle that the people have a right to governmen-
tal accountability.191 Thus, information collected and used by the
government must be accessible to the public. The Access to Public
Records and Meetings provision of the Florida Constitution firmly
protects that right of access. Nonetheless, the assurance of adequate
governmental accountability and fundamental rights of openness
should not force the citizens of Florida to forfeit the protection of
their personal information from being used for secondary commercial
purposes.
While both federal and international laws may soon force greater
recognition of technological privacy concerns, Florida should take the
opportunity now to provide its citizens with stronger privacy protec-
tions. Clearly, privacy concerns in the age of technology are in their
infancy and legislation to protect those concerns is in “an evolution-
ary state.”192 Equally clear is the fact that informational privacy is
not adequately protected. The question is: what can be done?
A.   By Constitutional Amendment
First, while our constitution does contain an explicit privacy pro-
vision to protect individuals against government intrusion, the pro-
vision should be expanded to include the right to be let alone and
free from private intrusion. This is an appropriate subject for consid-
eration by Florida’s 1998 Constitution Revision Commission. In ad-
dressing the 1998 Commission, Justice Overton specifically recom-
mended that the Commission address this issue. However, the
authors recognize that crafting an amendment that will provide ade-
quate protection to individuals and yet be flexible enough to accomo-
date technological advances will present a challenge to the Commis-
sion. To that end, the authors suggest that the Commission restruc-
ture the current amendment and insert language that will protect
individuals against private intrusion. For example:193
                                                                                                                   
190. See FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1995); see also supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
191. See Barfield v. City of Ft. Lauderdale Police Dep’t, 639 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla.
1994).
192. McKendry, supra note 19, at 19.
193. Legislative mandates should not be included in the constitutional provision itself.
The constitution is meant to set forth basic rights that are to be protected, as necessary,
by legislation. As former Florida Supreme Court Justice Parker Lee McDonald stated in
an advisory opinion to the Attorney General:
The legal principles in the state constitution inherently command a higher
status than any other legal rules in our society. By transcending time and
changing political mores, the constitution is a document that provides stability
in the law and society’s consensus on general, fundamental values. Statutory
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(a) Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his or her private life except as oth-
erwise provided herein.
(b) Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
non-governmental intrusion into his or her private life except as
provided by law.
(c) Nothing in Tthis section shall not be construed to limit the
public’s right of access to public records and meetings as provided
by law.
B.   By Legislation
Second, protective statutory provisions should be considered by
the Legislature. For instance, legislation could be enacted that en-
compasses the principles set forth in the Code of Fair Information
Practices and the Canadian Standards Association’s Privacy Princ i-
ples.194 At a minimum, legislation should allow consumers to correct
and update personally identifiable information, require services to
explain how and why they gather information and what information
is being gathered, restrict the disclosure of customer-related infor-
mation to third parties without permission of the customer, and
prohibit governmental entities from selling personal information for
secondary commercial purposes.
C.   By Each of Us as Individuals
Finally, it is important to understand that government alone
cannot protect us from ourselves. Each of us has an individual re-
sponsibility to do whatever possible to provide the privacy protec-
tions that each of us desires. We should know and understand what
can be done to protect our privacy. Government, whether by rule,
statute, or constitutional provision, cannot do it all. In his book enti-
tled Protect Your Privacy on the Internet ,195 Bryan Pfaffenberger
makes many recommendations about what individuals can do. For
example, he suggests that Internet users create bulletproof pass-
words. This can be designed by using the first letters of words in a
sentence that is easily remembered and interspersing numbers
throughout the letters.196 Pfaffenberger further recommends that us-
                                                                                                                   
law, on the other hand, provides a set of legal rules that are specific, easily
amended, and adaptable to the political, economic, and social changes of our
society.
Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla.
1993) (McDonald, J., concurring).
194. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
195. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 15.
196. See id. at 17-30.
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ers research the privacy protections provided by their Internet serv-
ice provider. This information should be made available before
making a decision to choose or change a provider.197 He also suggests
the use of software that prevents children from giving out personal
and family information to Internet groups and websites.198 Pfaffen-
berger urges users to think twice about filling out registration forms,
particularly when they do not know how that information is going to
be used.199 He suggests encrypting sensitive files and e-mail, and
notes that by mid-1997 the software should be readily available.200
He adds that users should use software specifically designed to de-
lete unwanted files and browser trails.201 Pfaffenberger also asks us-
ers to consider disabling the cookie trails they leave or to use a
cookie-less browser.202
Additionally, in their book Who Knows: Safeguarding Your Pr i-
vacy in a Networked World , authors Ann Cavoukian and Don Tap-
scott suggest the following “privacy tips”:
1. Question why you are asked for information.
2. Give only the minimum information required.
3. Ask why the information is needed.
4. Challenge the sale, rental, or exchange of your personal infor-
mation to third parties for secondary uses.
5. Ask to be opted-out of a direct mailing list.
6. Beware of special offers.
7. Pay with cash whenever possible.203
In sum, each of us should use these and other steps to protect our
own private information. Additionally, the passage of a constitu-
tional amendment similar to that proposed here, along with the en-
actment of appropriate legislation, should create a balance between
the legitimate need to obtain personal information and the violative
procurement and use of personal information. In closing, we leave
the reader with a final thought.
[U]ntil lawmakers make some fundamental changes about who can
sell what to whom, it seems unlikely that the tide of personal in-
formation washing up on the Internet’s shores will be stemmed.
And in the process, much of the privacy we’ve enjoyed because it
was simply too inconvenient to invade it will be eroded. Welcome
to the information age.204
                                                                                                                   
197. See id. at 31-40.
198. See id. at 256-68.
199. See id. at 56-65.
200. See id. at 170-81.
201. See id. at 182-200.
202. See id. at 210-29.
203. CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 200-01.
204. O’Malley, supra note 18, at 61.
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